In 1969, France's currency situation was defined by the enduring strength of the franc within the Bretton Woods system and the political imperative to maintain its fixed parity. The French franc, pegged at 4.937 francs to one US dollar, was considered a strong currency, a point of national pride meticulously defended by President Charles de Gaulle. This stability, however, came at a cost. To maintain the peg, France had to hold large gold and dollar reserves and implement strict capital controls, limiting the free flow of money in and out of the country. The system created underlying tensions, as domestic economic pressures periodically challenged the official exchange rate.
The year itself was marked by a significant monetary crisis. In the wake of the social upheaval of May 1968, the government had increased wages to restore calm, fueling inflation and a widening trade deficit. Speculators, doubting France's ability to uphold the franc's value, began a massive sell-off. Despite implementing austerity measures, the new Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and his Finance Minister, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, were forced to devalue the franc by 11.1% in August 1969. This decision, taken shortly after Georges Pompidou succeeded de Gaulle as president, was a strategic retreat to restore competitiveness and halt the drain on reserves.
This devaluation was a pivotal moment, signaling a pragmatic shift from de Gaulle's rigid defense of the franc
fort. It successfully stabilized the currency for a time, but it also exposed the growing fragility of the Bretton Woods system itself. The 1969 devaluation set the stage for France's subsequent monetary policy, which would increasingly focus on European exchange rate cooperation, a path that would eventually lead to the European Monetary System and, later, the euro.