In 2015, Egypt faced a severe and multifaceted currency crisis centered on a significant overvaluation of the Egyptian pound (EGP). The official exchange rate was artificially pegged at around 8.8 EGP to the US dollar, but a thriving black market saw the rate soar to over 12 EGP, reflecting a gap of nearly 40%. This disparity was fueled by a critical shortage of foreign currency, stemming from years of political instability following the 2011 revolution, which had devastated tourism and foreign investment—key sources of hard currency. Simultaneously, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) was burning through its foreign reserves to defend the unsustainable peg, depleting them to precarious levels.
The government, led by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was caught in a difficult policy bind. Maintaining the peg was draining reserves and creating a severe dollar liquidity crunch for importers, harming business confidence and leading to shortages of essential goods. However, a sudden devaluation risked stoking already high inflation and public discontent. As a stopgap measure, the CBE implemented strict capital controls and limited access to dollars for imports, prioritizing essentials like food and fuel. This created a complex and restrictive system that further hampered economic activity and encouraged the growth of the parallel market.
By the end of 2015, pressure for a major correction was overwhelming. The situation laid bare the structural weaknesses of Egypt's economy and set the stage for a more dramatic economic decision the following year. In 2016, Egypt would secure a $12 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the cornerstone of which was a commitment to freely float the pound—a move that would lead to its sharp devaluation but was deemed necessary to stabilize the economy, restore currency reserves, and attract foreign investment. Thus, 2015 was the culmination of mounting pressures that made a fundamental shift in exchange rate policy inevitable.