In 1897, France operated under the
Latin Monetary Union (LMU), a multinational bimetallic system it had spearheaded in 1865. The franc was defined by a fixed ratio of gold to silver (1:15.5), meaning both metals could be minted into legal tender coins. However, this system was under severe strain. A global decline in the market value of silver had created a significant discrepancy; silver coins, whose metallic value was now lower than their face value, flooded circulation, while gold coins were increasingly hoarded or exported (Gresham's Law in action). This effectively pushed France toward a de facto gold standard, as it restricted the minting of silver to prop up the system.
Domestically, the currency was stable and trusted, with the
franc germinal—established by Napoleon in 1803—providing a century of remarkable consistency. The Bank of France held substantial gold reserves to back the currency, ensuring public and international confidence. However, the state's finances were preoccupied with the massive project of issuing the first series of
interest-bearing bonds (rentes) to fund the payment of the war indemnity to Germany following the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). This financial burden, though largely managed by the 1890s, had long-term implications for fiscal policy.
Internationally, the flaws of the LMU were becoming untenable. Member states struggled to coordinate, and the union was slowly disintegrating under the pressure of fluctuating silver prices. For France, this period was one of monetary transition and anxiety, caught between its historic commitment to bimetallism and the inexorable global shift toward the gold standard, which it would formally adopt in practice within a few years. The currency situation of 1897 was thus characterized by outward stability masking deep structural fragility within the multinational system France had created.