In 2009, Libya's currency situation was characterized by strict state control and relative stability, underpinned by the nation's vast oil wealth. The Libyan Dinar (LYD) was not a freely convertible currency; its exchange rate was pegged to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket of the International Monetary Fund, with a heavy weighting towards the US Dollar. This peg, maintained by the Central Bank of Libya, resulted in an official exchange rate of approximately 1.25 LYD to 1 USD, a rate that was artificially strong and did not reflect market pressures. Foreign exchange transactions were tightly regulated, requiring approval from the central bank, which managed the country's substantial foreign reserves accumulated from hydrocarbon exports.
This rigid system functioned to control inflation and maintain economic sovereignty, but it also fostered a significant black market for currency. The disparity between the official rate and the informal market rate, where dinars traded for less than their official value, emerged due to restrictions on access to foreign currency for imports and travel, as well as capital controls. While the gap was not as extreme as in later years of conflict, it indicated underlying economic distortions and the limitations of a state-dominated economy under Muammar Gaddafi's rule, where political priorities often dictated financial policy.
Overall, the pre-2011 currency regime reflected Libya's centralized economy. Stability was artificially maintained through oil revenue and control, masking inefficiencies and a lack of financial liberalization. The system was vulnerable to external shocks, a weakness that would be catastrophically exposed following the 2011 revolution and the subsequent collapse of unified state institutions, leading to monetary fragmentation and severe devaluation in the years that followed.