In 1703, Iran was under the rule of the Safavid dynasty, specifically during the latter part of the reign of Sultan Husayn (1694–1722). The currency situation was complex and increasingly unstable, reflecting the broader economic and political decline that would culminate in the dynasty's collapse. The primary unit was the silver
abbasi (worth 200 dinars), alongside the
shahi (50 dinars) and the gold
toman (a money of account worth 10,000 dinars or 50 abbasi). Coins were minted in various cities, leading to inconsistencies in weight and purity, which complicated trade and taxation.
The period was marked by a critical shortage of silver, a problem plaguing the entire Safavid Empire in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. This scarcity was caused by a combination of factors: a negative balance of trade that drained bullion to pay for imports, particularly from the Dutch and English East India Companies; inefficient state mines; and the hoarding of precious metals by a nervous populace and elite. Consequently, the government increasingly resorted to debasement—reducing the silver content in coins—to stretch its metal reserves and meet fiscal obligations, eroding public trust in the currency.
This monetary instability exacerbated and was exacerbated by weak central administration, rampant corruption, and the rising power of Shi'a clerical institutions that amassed independent wealth. The debased and unreliable coinage disrupted markets, increased inflation for basic goods, and strained the traditional
tiyul (land-grant) system used to pay soldiers and officials. Thus, the currency crisis of 1703 was not an isolated issue but a symptomatic fracture in the Safavid economic structure, contributing directly to the internal vulnerability that would allow the Afghan Hotaki invasion to succeed just over two decades later.