By 1711, the Spanish Netherlands was in the throes of a severe and protracted monetary crisis, a direct consequence of the War of the Spanish Succession. The region, a battleground for over a decade, was financially exhausted from supporting occupying armies—primarily those of the Allied powers (Britain and the Dutch Republic) who administered it on behalf of the Habsburg claimant, Archduke Charles. To fund the war effort, these authorities, alongside the Spanish crown-in-exile, repeatedly debased the coinage by reducing the precious metal content, leading to a flood of low-value
moneda de vellón (billon coins) and a sharp decline in the value of higher-quality full-weight coins, which were either hoarded or exported.
This situation created a chaotic "bad money drives out good" (Gresham's Law) environment. Multiple currencies circulated simultaneously: heavily debased local coins, older full-weight coins traded at a premium, and various foreign currencies from neighbouring states. The lack of a uniform, trusted medium of exchange crippled commerce and daily life, as prices became unstable and unpredictable. Merchants and the public struggled with complex and fluctuating exchange rates, which stifled economic activity and bred widespread uncertainty and hardship among the population.
Ultimately, the monetary disarray of 1711 was a stark symptom of the region's political limbo. With no sovereign power possessing both the authority and the will to implement a comprehensive recoinage and enforce monetary stability, the crisis persisted. The resolution would only begin to materialize after the war's conclusion with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713-1714), which transferred the territory to Austrian Habsburg rule, allowing the new administration to eventually undertake the necessary and arduous process of monetary reform.