In 1985, Equatorial Guinea's currency situation was defined by its reliance on the
Central African CFA franc (XAF), a colonial-era arrangement it maintained after independence from Spain in 1968. The country was, and remains, a member of the
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). This meant its monetary policy was effectively outsourced to the
Bank of Central African States (BEAC) in Yaoundé, Cameroon, which guaranteed the currency's convertibility and pegged it at a fixed rate to the French franc (FFr 1 = CFA 50). This provided rare monetary stability for the nation but also meant Equatorial Guinea had no independent control over its currency, interest rates, or money supply.
Economically, the context in 1985 was one of profound stagnation and poverty, despite the fixed exchange rate's stability. The country was not yet an oil producer (with significant discoveries still a few years away), and its economy relied on declining cocoa and coffee exports. The fixed CFA franc peg, while preventing hyperinflation, was often criticized for being overvalued, making the country's non-oil exports less competitive on the global market. This overvaluation, combined with systemic corruption and mismanagement under the regime of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, stifled economic diversification and contributed to a severe lack of foreign exchange from legitimate exports.
Consequently, the formal currency situation belied a harsh reality on the ground. While the CFA franc was legally stable, the vast majority of the population experienced extreme hardship. Access to the currency itself was limited for many, and a
vital parallel market for foreign exchange likely existed, though overshadowed by the country's isolation and tight controls. The stability of the CFA franc was a macroeconomic fact that did not translate into domestic prosperity, as Equatorial Guinea remained one of the world's poorest nations, with its monetary system offering stability but doing little to stimulate a bankrupt real economy.