In 1824, Iran’s currency system was a complex and fragmented reflection of its political and economic state under the Qajar dynasty. The country lacked a unified, modern monetary system, relying instead on a variety of gold, silver, and copper coins minted in different cities. The primary silver unit was the
qiran (later the rial), but its weight and purity were not standardized, leading to significant regional variations. Alongside these, foreign currencies like the Russian ruble, British pound, and Ottoman lira circulated widely, especially in border regions and trade hubs, further complicating transactions.
This monetary disarray was exacerbated by chronic state bankruptcy and debasement. The Qajar treasury, strained by royal extravagance, military campaigns, and a weak tax base, frequently resorted to reducing the silver content in coins to generate short-term revenue. This practice, known as
ta'fīsh, led to severe inflation, a loss of public confidence in the currency, and the hoarding of older, purer coins. Consequently, exchange rates between different coin types and foreign currencies fluctuated wildly, creating a haven for money-changers (
ṣarrāfs) who became essential yet powerful intermediaries in the economy.
The situation was fundamentally tied to Iran’s integration into the global economy as a peripheral exporter of raw materials like silk, wool, and cotton. The trade imbalance, particularly with Russia and Britain, drained the country of specie (gold and silver), worsening the currency shortage. There was no central bank, and the monetary policy was virtually non-existent, reacting to fiscal desperation rather than economic strategy. Thus, in 1824, Iran’s currency was not a tool of national economic power but a symptom of administrative weakness and a growing dependence on European commercial and political influence.