In 1857, the Joseon Dynasty was grappling with a severe and multifaceted currency crisis rooted in decades of monetary instability. The primary circulating coin, the
sangpyeong tongbo brass cash coin, had been drastically debased since the early 19th century, with its copper content reduced and adulterated with cheaper metals like lead and tin. This led to a classic case of Gresham's Law, where "bad money drives out good." High-quality coins, including older
sangpyeong tongbo and imported Chinese copper coins, were hoarded or melted down, leaving the economy flooded with lightweight, easily counterfeited coins that the public deeply distrusted.
The crisis was exacerbated by rampant counterfeiting, which became a widespread and socially destabilizing activity. Both private criminal networks and even corrupt government officials operated clandestine mints, further saturating the market with illegitimate coins. This collapse of confidence in the official currency spurred a retreat to a barter economy in many regions, with rice and cloth becoming de facto mediums of exchange. The monetary disorder crippled taxation and state finances, as the nominal value of coin taxes collected bore little relation to their actual metallic worth, weakening the central government's fiscal authority.
This monetary chaos occurred within a broader context of agricultural hardship, institutional decay, and the growing pressure of Western imperialism in East Asia. While the dynasty attempted reforms, such as issuing new coinage or recalling old coins, these measures were largely ineffective without addressing the fundamental issues of quality control and enforcement. The currency crisis of 1857 thus reflected and accelerated the Joseon state's deepening internal vulnerabilities on the eve of a period of immense external upheaval.