In 1852, the currency system of the Joseon Dynasty was in a state of profound instability, caught between a rigid, state-managed ideal and a chaotic, inflationary reality. The official system was bimetallic, relying on low-denomination
yeopjeon (brass coins) for daily transactions and high-value
yang (silver bars) for large-scale commerce and taxation. However, the state's chronic fiscal deficits, exacerbated by corruption and weak central authority, led to repeated, unbacked coin minting. The
Dangbaekjeon, a large-denomination brass coin introduced in the 17th century, had been debased and over-issued, triggering severe inflation and a loss of public trust in government-issued currency.
This monetary decay fueled a widespread reliance on
private currency, most notably
hwalgu (arrow coins), which were silver tokens privately minted and guaranteed by powerful merchant guilds in major cities like Kaesong. These tokens, alongside various forms of
unjang (promissory notes) and commodity money like rice and cloth, formed a parallel economy that functioned more reliably than the official coinage. The circulation of these private currencies was a clear symptom of the state's failure to control the monetary supply and its retreat from one of its fundamental sovereign responsibilities.
The situation was further strained by external pressures. While the policy of
seclusion remained officially in place, silver outflow to Qing China for trade imbalances was a persistent drain. Moreover, the peasantry bore the heaviest burden, as taxes were often calculated in grain or silver but collected in devalued coin, effectively increasing their obligations. Thus, the currency chaos of 1852 was not merely an economic issue but a critical manifestation of the dynasty's systemic administrative decay and its weakening grip on the economy, foreshadowing the greater crises that would unfold in the coming decades.