5 Cash – Empire of China

In 1853, the Qing Dynasty's monetary system was in a state of severe crisis, primarily driven by the immense costs of suppressing the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864). The imperial treasury was depleted, and the traditional system of bimetallic coinage—silver taels (by weight) for large transactions and bronze cash coins for daily use—was under enormous strain. A critical shortage of silver, exacerbated by the Opium Wars and subsequent trade imbalances, caused a sharp rise in the silver-to-copper exchange rate. This devastated peasants and laborers who earned in copper but paid taxes assessed in silver, leading to widespread economic hardship and social unrest.

In response to this fiscal emergency, the Xianfeng Emperor's court, under the guidance of officials like Grand Secretary Sengge Rinchen, embarked on a radical and ultimately disastrous experiment with fiduciary currency. Beginning in 1853, the government introduced hubu guanpiao (official banknotes) and tieqian (iron cash coins) intended to circulate at parity with their silver and copper counterparts. Most infamously, it also issued "Great Qing Treasure Note" paper money and large-denomination copper coins with wildly inflated face values, such as the daqian worth 500 or even 1000 standard cash coins.

These measures, however, were not backed by precious metal reserves or public confidence. The government printed notes and minted debased coins excessively to fund military campaigns, leading to rapid hyperinflation. Merchants refused to accept the new currencies at their nominal values, and the economy teetered on collapse. By the mid-1850s, the experiment had failed utterly; the new currencies became virtually worthless, severely damaging the state's credibility and exacerbating the very economic turmoil it was meant to solve, further weakening the Qing regime amidst the colossal internal rebellion.