In 1964, Egypt's currency situation was fundamentally shaped by the economic policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab Socialist government. The Egyptian pound (EGP) operated under a fixed exchange rate system, officially pegged to the British pound sterling and, by extension, to the US dollar through the Bretton Woods system. This official parity, however, masked a complex reality of exchange controls and a thriving black market. The government maintained a system of multiple exchange rates to manage foreign exchange scarcity, with preferential rates for essential imports like food and medicine, and less favourable rates for luxury goods and other transactions.
This rigid framework was under growing strain due to the structural weaknesses of Egypt's state-led economy. Ambitious industrialization and welfare programs, coupled with significant military expenditures, led to persistent budget deficits and rising inflation. While not yet in crisis, the overvalued official exchange rate discouraged exports (aside from cotton) and encouraged imports, worsening the trade deficit. Foreign exchange reserves were carefully rationed to service debt and fund national projects, reflecting an economy increasingly isolated from global capital flows and reliant on administrative controls rather than market mechanisms.
The currency regime of 1964 thus represented a period of managed stability before the more severe economic challenges that would follow later in the decade, particularly after the 1967 Six-Day War. It was a system designed for control and socialist planning, prioritizing self-sufficiency and social equity over convertibility or integration with international markets. The inherent pressures of this model—foreign exchange shortages, inflationary financing, and a burdensome subsidy system—were already evident, setting the stage for the devaluations and economic liberalizations that would begin in the 1970s.