In 1978, Indonesia faced a critical juncture in its economic management, culminating in the dramatic devaluation of the rupiah on November 15. This policy, known as
Sanering and enacted by President Suharto's New Order government, slashed the currency's value by 33.6% against the US dollar. The primary trigger was a sharp decline in global oil prices, which severely threatened Indonesia's main source of export revenue and government income. This external shock exposed underlying vulnerabilities, including a growing current account deficit and rising inflation, which a fixed exchange rate regime could no longer sustain.
The devaluation was a strategic, albeit painful, corrective measure championed by the economic technocrats known as the "Berkeley Mafia." Their aim was to restore international competitiveness by making non-oil exports like timber, rubber, and textiles cheaper abroad, while discouraging costly imports. This shift was essential to diversify the economy away from its over-reliance on oil and gas. The move was also a precondition for securing continued financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international creditors, who advocated for market-oriented adjustments.
The 1978 devaluation marked a definitive turn in Indonesia's macroeconomic policy, moving from a rigidly fixed exchange rate to a managed float system with periodic adjustments. While it initially spurred inflation and public anxiety, the policy ultimately succeeded in boosting non-oil exports and setting a precedent for future economic reforms. It is remembered as a watershed moment that underscored the country's vulnerability to commodity price swings and demonstrated the government's willingness to implement decisive, technocrat-led measures to maintain economic stability and growth.