In 1987, Poland's currency situation was a critical symptom of the deepening crisis within its centrally planned economy. The Polish złoty (PLN) was a non-convertible currency, artificially pegged by the communist government at an official rate that bore no relation to its real market value. This created a vast black market for foreign currency, particularly US dollars and West German marks, where the złoty traded at a fraction of its official rate. This "dollarization" of the economy was pervasive, as hard currency became essential for purchasing scarce goods, accessing luxury items, or even for meaningful savings, severely undermining confidence in the national currency.
The root causes were systemic: decades of economic mismanagement, massive foreign debt accumulated in the 1970s, chronic shortages of consumer goods, and hyperinflation that had peaked earlier in the decade. Although the martial law period of the early 1980s had imposed a grim stability, by 1987 inflationary pressures were again building. The government, led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, was attempting limited reforms without abandoning socialist principles, but its efforts to control prices and wages only distorted the economy further. Production was inefficient, and the złoty's inability to be exchanged internationally stifled trade and investment.
This monetary dysfunction was a key factor pushing the authorities toward negotiations with the banned Solidarity trade union. The regime recognized that economic recovery—and accessing crucial Western loans—was impossible without political stabilization and more radical market reforms. Thus, the currency chaos of 1987 set the stage for the pivotal political transformations that would follow, culminating in the Round Table Talks of 1989 and the eventual transition to a market economy, where establishing a stable, convertible złoty became a paramount goal.