In 1854, Iran's monetary system was a complex and fragmented reflection of its weak central authority and economic integration into global trade networks. The country operated on a bimetallic standard, with silver
qirāns and gold
tomans as the primary units of account (one toman equaling ten qirāns). However, the actual coinage in circulation was a chaotic mix of domestic and foreign currencies. Domestically minted coins, such as the silver
ʿabbāsi and copper
shāhis, varied widely in weight and purity due to decentralized minting operations controlled by provincial governors and tribal khans. This lack of standardization eroded public trust and hampered commerce.
The situation was further complicated by the heavy influx of foreign silver, particularly Russian rubles and Maria Theresa thalers, which circulated freely due to their reliable silver content. These foreign coins often traded at a premium over their Iranian counterparts, leading to Gresham's Law in practice: "bad money drives out good." The government in Tehran, under Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, struggled to control the money supply. Chronic budget deficits, driven by royal extravagance and military expenses, were frequently addressed by debasing the coinage—reducing the silver content in new mintings to create short-term revenue, which only accelerated inflation and further undermined the currency's credibility.
This monetary instability was symptomatic of broader 19th-century challenges. Iran's economy was increasingly pressured by European imperial interests, with Russia and Britain exerting significant political and commercial influence. The state's inability to reform its fiscal and monetary systems left it vulnerable, as internal trade suffered from exchange uncertainty and external trade balances were difficult to manage. Thus, the currency situation of 1854 was not merely a financial issue but a clear indicator of the Qajar dynasty's diminishing control over the national economy and its subordination to global economic forces beyond its command.