In 1997, Greece's currency situation was defined by its determined pursuit to join the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the euro. The country was still operating with its national currency, the Greek drachma, but its economic policies were entirely oriented toward meeting the strict convergence criteria outlined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. These criteria included targets for inflation, interest rates, budget deficits, public debt, and exchange rate stability. For Greece, which had a history of high inflation and fiscal imbalances, this was a formidable challenge, requiring significant austerity measures and structural reforms.
The primary focus was on stabilizing the drachma within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which Greece had entered in March 1998, just after the period in question. Throughout 1997, the government, under Prime Minister Costas Simitis, implemented a "hard drachma" policy, maintaining tight monetary control and high interest rates to strengthen the currency and curb inflation. This period was marked by a painful but deliberate squeeze, as the government worked to demonstrate its commitment to European integration and convince skeptical EU partners, particularly Germany, of its economic discipline and readiness for the single currency.
However, underlying this drive for convergence were persistent and severe structural weaknesses. Greece's public debt burden, at well over 100% of GDP, was by far the highest among EU aspirants and nearly double the Maastricht reference value of 60%. There were also serious concerns regarding the reliability of its economic statistics, which would later erupt into scandal. Thus, while 1997 was a year of outward progress and preparation for eurozone entry, it was also a period where the foundations of future crisis—excessive debt and questionable fiscal reporting—were being cemented beneath a surface of nominal convergence.