In 1827, Iran’s currency system was in a state of profound disarray, a legacy of earlier 19th-century crises and weak central authority. The country operated on a bimetallic system of silver
qirans and gold
tomans, but the coinage was heavily debased. Successive Qajar shahs, facing massive state expenses for military campaigns and the royal court, had resorted to striking coins with progressively lower silver content to generate short-term revenue. This resulted in a chaotic circulation of coins of varying weights and purities from different mints and reigns, severely undermining public trust and hindering commerce.
This monetary instability was exacerbated by external pressures and a fragmented economy. Following the Russo-Persian Wars (1804–1813 and 1826–1828), Iran was forced into the Treaty of Turkmenchay in early 1828, which imposed a heavy indemnity of 20 million silver roubles on the state. While the treaty was signed in 1828, its financial terms were being negotiated and anticipated in 1827, placing immense strain on the treasury. The indemnity payments, which had to be made in pure silver, further drained the country of its sound currency, leaving the debased coins in domestic circulation and accelerating inflation.
Consequently, the year 1827 represented a low point on the path to a full monetary crisis. Internal trade was hampered by the need for money-changers to assess each coin, while external trade suffered due to the lack of a reliable standard. The state’s inability to reform the coinage or control its finances reflected the broader weaknesses of the Qajar administration. Thus, the currency situation on the eve of the Turkmenchay Treaty was one of severe depreciation and fragmentation, setting the stage for further economic hardship and foreign financial intervention in the decades to follow.