In 1759, the Zaidi State in Yemen, ruled by Imam al-Mahdi Abbas, was grappling with a severe and multifaceted currency crisis. The state’s primary silver coin, the
riyal da`wah (or "Spanish dollar"), was in short supply due to a broader regional scarcity of silver. This was exacerbated by Yemen's declining position in international trade, as European merchants increasingly bypassed its ports for others in the region, reducing the inflow of foreign coinage. Furthermore, internal instability and tribal rebellions disrupted tax collection and state control over the highlands, crippling the treasury's ability to mint a consistent and trusted currency.
The vacuum was filled by a chaotic mix of older, clipped, and debased coins still in circulation, alongside a flood of inferior foreign coins. Ottoman
piastres, Indian
rupees, and various European silver pieces circulated at fluctuating values, creating a bewildering and unreliable monetary environment. This lack of a uniform, state-backed currency severely hampered both daily commerce and the government's fiscal administration. Merchants and the public faced constant uncertainty in transactions, which stifled trade and economic activity at a time when the Imamate's authority was already under strain.
Consequently, the monetary disarray of 1759 was both a symptom and a cause of the Zaidi State's political fragility. The inability to control the currency undermined the Imam's economic sovereignty and prestige, as the foundational Islamic right of minting (
sikka) was effectively compromised. This crisis contributed to a period of stagnation and decentralization, weakening the central government in Sana'a and foreshadowing the greater political fragmentation and foreign intervention that would characterize Yemen in the coming decades.