In 1687, the currency situation in Baghdad Eyalet was one of profound instability and debasement, a direct consequence of the wider financial crisis gripping the Ottoman Empire. The central treasury in Istanbul, chronically short of specie due to prolonged wars, military defeats, and inefficient taxation, regularly resorted to currency manipulation. The primary silver coin, the
akçe, had been so drastically reduced in silver content over the preceding decades that it was nearly valueless, leading to a severe loss of public confidence. In Baghdad, this meant that official Ottoman coinage was often scarce and untrusted, forcing local markets to rely heavily on a patchwork of older, purer coins still in circulation and foreign currencies.
The real economic life of the eyalet depended on a heterogeneous mix of coins. Spanish pieces of eight and other European silver thalers, brought via Indian Ocean and overland trade routes, served as the dominant high-value currency for large transactions and long-distance commerce. Alongside these, Persian silver
abbasi coins and Mughal Indian rupees circulated freely due to Baghdad's pivotal role as a trade nexus between the Safavid and Ottoman empires. This reliance on foreign silver created a dual system: state accounts and official obligations were nominally in debased Ottoman currency, while the vibrant bazaars and merchant houses operated on a more stable, international metallic standard.
This monetary fragmentation was exacerbated by the semi-autonomous rule of the local pashas, who often minted their own copper coins (
mangır) for small-scale daily transactions. The disconnect between the official, degraded currency and the practical needs of the economy led to frequent price fluctuations, exchange rate arbitrage, and significant hardship for soldiers and civil servants paid in nearly worthless
akçe. Thus, the currency landscape of Baghdad in 1687 was not one of unified imperial control, but of adaptive, localized chaos shaped by global bullion flows and imperial decline.