4 Mark – Norway

In 1723, Norway found itself in a precarious monetary situation, deeply entangled with its political union with Denmark. As part of the Danish-Norwegian state, Norway did not control its own currency. The primary circulating coin was the Danish riksdaler, but a severe shortage of official minted specie plagued the country. This scarcity was exacerbated by Norway's persistent trade deficit with Denmark, which caused silver coins to continually flow out of the kingdom to settle debts, leaving the domestic economy chronically under-monetized.

To facilitate everyday transactions in the absence of sufficient official coinage, a parallel system of "credit money" had become essential. Since 1695, the state had issued kreditivsedler (credit notes), which were essentially IOUs or treasury bonds that circulated as a form of paper currency. Furthermore, local merchants and officials issued their own veksler (promissory notes). While this private credit system kept commerce functioning, it was fragmented and inherently unstable, with the value of these notes fluctuating based on the trustworthiness of the issuer and the economic conditions of the region.

The year 1723 fell within a period of attempted reform under King Frederik IV. Just two years prior, in 1721, a state loan bank had been established in Christiania (Oslo) to regulate credit and provide more stability. However, the fundamental structural problems remained unresolved. The economy was still vulnerable, the outflow of silver continued, and the reliance on a patchwork of paper promises meant the monetary system was fragile. This situation would persist until more centralized reforms later in the century, leaving Norway in 1723 with a complex and strained dual system of scarce official coinage and necessary but risky credit instruments.