By 1965, the Soviet Union’s currency system was a study in contrasts, defined by the strict separation of the domestic "ruble zone" from the global economy. Internally, the State Bank (Gosbank) issued the Soviet ruble (SUR), which was a non-convertible administrative instrument rather than a market-driven currency. Its value was set arbitrarily by the state, with an official exchange rate wildly divorced from reality—pegged at 0.90 rubles to the US dollar for propaganda purposes, while the actual economic worth, as reflected on the limited black market, was closer to 6-10 rubles per dollar. This system facilitated central planning, but masked severe inefficiencies and a growing gap between the money supply and the availability of quality consumer goods.
The domestic economy operated on a dual monetary track. The cash ruble was used by the population for everyday transactions in the consumer sector, which was chronically plagued by shortages and queues. Simultaneously, a separate system of "non-cash" or "transferable" rubles existed exclusively for state-owned enterprises to record transactions within the planned economy. This artificial division prevented citizens from accessing the funds in the industrial sector, but it also allowed the state to hide the true cost of production and subsidize essential goods, creating an illusion of stability.
Internationally, the ruble was virtually meaningless for trade. Soviet foreign trade was conducted through a handful of state banks using hard currency reserves (like dollars or gold) or through complex bilateral barter agreements with other Comecon countries. A separate "transferable ruble" was used for accounting within the Eastern Bloc, but it was not a real currency and could not be converted. Thus, by 1965, the Soviet monetary situation was stable on the surface but fundamentally fragile, insulating the population from world prices while accumulating the distortions that would contribute to stagnation in the following decades.